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Abstract 
 
Environmental problems are often amplified by agglomeration of activities. We show that 
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1. Introduction 
 
A large literature has studied the interactions between trade and environment. In this framework, a lot 
of papers have analyzed the effects of freer trade on environment with local (Barrett, 1994; Antweiler, 
Copeland and Taylor, 2001) or transboundary (Copeland and Taylor, 1995) pollution. 
In contrast, in our paper, we focus on the interaction between environmental policy and agglomeration 
of environmentally sensitive industries. Many papers have discussed the spatial dimension of 
environmental policies. Most of them consider an oligopoly market producing a homogeneous good 
and analyze the problem of plant relocation decisions in response to environmental restrictions 
(Markusen, Morey and Olewiler, 1995; Hoel, 1997; Petrakis and Xepapadeas, 2003). Other papers 
study the trade off between the negative effects of deterioration in the environmental quality and 
positive agglomeration externalities in a spatial equilibrium of cities (Papageorgiou and Pines, 2000; 
Tabuchi, 1998). However, there are still two related issues where there is a lack of theoretical research 
in the spatial dimension of environmental problems. One is the differentiated-goods models and the 
other is the effect of environmental policies on the agglomeration of activities. Most of the time, the 
pollution problems are aggravated by agglomeration. Traffic-jams, hurtful emissions by clustered 
polluting industries, or pollution of soil and rivers by concentrated agricultural activities are some 
examples. However empirical evidence shows that such agglomerations exist. This paper discusses the 
impact of environmental policies on the agglomeration of people and activities. We argue that 
environmental policies may be subject to a kind of moral hazard problem: because each firm (or agent) 
is less polluting when a regulator enforces an emission tax or quota, the global disutility of pollution 
decreases with environmental policies and this strengthens the incentive for people and activities to 
agglomerate. The final result may be more pollution because of the scale effect, even if each firm is 
cleaner. Copeland and Taylor, 1999, have also shown, in a model where pollution policy is ruled out, 
that, under some conditions, feedback effects can occur between trade and environment. What is new 
in our results is that the environmental degradation is brought on by the domestic environmental 
policy itself. 
We adapt the analytical framework from the economic geography model that has highlighted the 
conditions under which geographic concentration of activities occurs (Krugman, 1991a, 1991b). In 
that basic model without congestion costs, the market size effect always leads to agglomeration of 
industries in the larger region unless the transport cost is prohibitive. 
In this paper we assume that firms are polluting and we introduce a disutility of pollution in the 
agents’ welfare. We show that this disutility undermines the incentive to agglomerate in the large 
region. Finally, we introduce an environmental regulation which decreases at first the global pollution. 
It follows that the agents’ welfare, net of the disutility of pollution, is now higher and that the larger 
region becomes, once again, more attractive. 
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2. The model 
 
At first, we follow Krugman’s model closely. In two regions, i=1,2, we consider two categories of 
consumers, mobile workers and immobile farmers. The regions differ only in one respect: the number 
Li of workers. The overall number of mobile workers is µ ,  and L1=f µ  and L2 = (1-f)µ, with 0≤ f ≤1. 
In each region there are (1-µ)/ 2 farmers. 
 Farmers and workers have identical preferences. Their utility (equivalent in this particular model to 
their real wage) is described by: 
 µµ −= 1am CCU     (1) 
where Ca is consumption of the homogeneous agricultural good (used as numeraire) and Cm is the 
Dixit-Stiglitz, 1977, subutility function: 
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with σ >1, the elasticity of substitution among the n manufactured goods (and the perceived price 
elasticity of demand). 
The amount of labor lk required to produce a quantity xk  of good k (k=1…n) is 
 kk xl βα +=     (3) 
where α is fixed cost and β constant marginal cost. Increasing returns to scale imply that each firm 
in each region produces a single product. The firms are Chamberlinian monopolistic competitors 
and, in equilibrium, set a price Pi that is uniform within each region: 
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with Wi the wage rate of workers in region i. 
Free entry and exit conditions imply     )1( −=∗ σβ
αx    (5) 
where x*, common to every active firm, is the equilibrium quantity produced by each firm, 
whatever the region.  
The full employment condition determines the number of firms in each region: 
 
ασ
ii Ln =  2,1=∀i .   (6) 
Krugman assumes that the agricultural good can be freely transported from one region to the other. 
Transportation costs for manufactured goods take Samuelson’s iceberg form: 10 ≤≤r , an inverse 
index of transportation cost, is the fraction of one unit of manufactured good that, shipped from one 
region, reaches the other. 
Demand for each industrial good is obtained by maximizing consumers’ utility (given by (1) and 
(2)), subject to their budget constraint. 
Equating supply (5) and demand for each good in both regions, together with the full employment 
condition (6) determines the equilibrium prices and wages for a given allocation of workers, Li 
1
2
1
21
22
1
2
1
21
11
1
2
1
2
1
)1(
−−




+
−
+
+




+
−
+
=−
σσ
µµ
µ
σβ
α
rW
W
nn
LW
W
rW
nn
LW
P
   (7) 
 
1
1
2
12
22
1
1
2
12
11
2
2
1
2
1
)1(
−−




+
−
+
+




+
−
+
=−
σσ
µµ
µ
σβ
α
W
rWnn
LW
rW
Wnn
LW
P
.   (8) 
 3 
Using the results of maximizing agents’ utility and relation (1), the workers’ real wages in each 
region are  
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Assuming that workers move, from the low to the high real wage region, Krugman shows that 
when transportation cost falls below some critical level (r*), the larger region has the higher real 
wage because of the larger size of the local market: the result is a tendency to concentration of all 
manufacturing in this region. 
We assume now that firms are polluting. Pollution, purely local, is a by-product of the 
manufactured good production process. As assumed most of the time in the environmental 
literature, we consider that the relation between emission (e) and production (x) by each firm is 
linear and given by e= θx, where θ>0 represents the firms’ environmental performance (a lower θ 
means less polluting emissions). Assume that workers are harmed by the global pollution (ni e) and 
take into account this disutility when they decide to migrate or not. They move now from the low 
to the high welfare region: in region “i” the workers’ welfare net of the global disutility of pollution 
is: 
 Si= Ui- D(ni θx)    (11) 
 
where Ui is the real wage in region i (given by (1)) and D(ni θx) measures the global negative 
impact of pollution on health or utility. Following most of the models in the related literature, we 
assume damages are separable. As a result, in our model (as in Chichilnisky, 1994 and Copeland 
and Taylor, 1995) there are no substitution effects between environment and marketed goods. 
Smith and Espinoza, 1996 have considered in a computable general equilibrium model, the 
jointness of marketed and environmental goods. They show that the non-separability assumption 
has an impact on the evaluation on trade policy and demonstrate that feedback effects may produce 
counterintuitive results. Because we focus on the linkage between agglomeration and 
environmental policy, we assume here that pollution affects only the level of utility: this simple 
framework allows to isolate the centripetal and centrifugal effects which are central arguments in 
this kind of model. Global disutility is increasing in the global emission, and thus in the number of 
firms and the output per firm. In the remainder of the article, it will be useful to work with a linear 
function D(ni θx)≡ δ ni θx with 0<δ <1. 
 Clearly, the workers’ welfare has now two components working in opposite ways: if region 1 is 
the larger region (f >  0.5), on the one hand, as in the basic model, it is more attractive to workers 
than the other region because the real wage is higher, U1> U2 (the market size effect) but, on the 
other hand, it is less attractive because the disutility of pollution increases in the region where 
agglomeration occurs and plays the role of a centrifugal force. The result of the tension between 
centripetal and centrifugal forces depends on the relative values of the parameters. For given values 
of α, β, µ and  σ, the critical level of the transportation cost (leading to a concentrated sustainable 
equilibrium because S1 >S2) decreases when the marginal damage δ  increases (r*’(δ)>0). It 
follows that a concentration of all activities in a single region is now less likely to occur. 
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Obviously, for given values of µ, σ , and r, there exists a limit value of δ such that workers are so 
deterred by pollution that agglomeration of firms never occurs. 
 
3. The effect of environmental policy on agglomeration equilibrium 
 
 It is well known that polluting agents need to be induced to internalize the social cost of pollution 
damage, otherwise they would engage in excessive levels of polluting emission. We assume that a 
national environmental regulator enforces in both regions a quota of emission. It follows that 
firms must undertake a costly abatement effort in order to reduce their emission level, by reducing 
θ.. This effort results in an increase in marginal cost β( θ) with β’( θ) <0. This is the only way to 
introduce a pollution control in this kind of partial equilibrium and particular economic geography 
framework (in CGE analyses, like in Smith and Espinoza, 1996, a more complex pollution control 
can be incorporated in order to show how emission control will both affect and be affected by final 
good consumption). 
Let us underline that we focus entirely on the costs imposed by the regulator: we are neither 
concerned, here, by the choice among policy instruments, nor by the optimal quota level (for a 
survey, see Cropper and Oates, 1992). We simply assume that the firms’ behavior is Pareto-
efficient: given the announced quota, the polluting agent undertakes an effort increasing its costs 
such that the marginal benefit from reduced pollution equals the marginal abatement cost. 
What is the impact of such an environmental policy on the agents’ welfare, then on their location 
decision? We have to consider the two components of Si. 
First, let us consider the centripetal force. It depends on the difference between the real wages (U1-
U2). Several results are apparent from equations (4), (5) and (6). 
 Faced with a higher marginal cost, firms lower their production level (5) and raise their price (4). 
The number of firms in each region is unchanged (6). 
It follows that pollution, as a by-product of production, falls since θ is lower and because global 
output (ni x*) decreases in both regions. This is the positive impact of the environmental policy.  
Workers’ wages are unchanged when β increases: using (4), it is easy to see in (7) and (8) that 
nominal wages are not modified because supply and global demand fall in the same proportion. 
Real wages are lowered, through higher prices. In equations (9) and (10) we can check that 
workers’ utilities (U1, U2) decrease in the same proportion in both regions when β increases. It 
follows that the difference (U1-U2) falls also in the same proportion, and obviously reaches zero 
(U1=U2) for the same critical level of r (r*) whatever the value of β. The interesting result is that 
the break point, r*, where the real wage becomes higher in the large region (U1>U2), is the same 
whatever the marginal cost level. The result is that the centripetal force is unchanged when β 
increases. 
Let us consider now the centrifugal force. It depends on the difference between the regions’ global 
disutility of pollution. We have underlined that pollution decreases in both region with a higher 
marginal cost. The important result here is that, because ni is proportional to Li (6), the decrease in 
the global disutility of pollution (δni θx) is higher in the larger region. As a consequence, the 
centrifugal force is softened by the environmental policy. Because the centripetal force is 
unchanged, the striking result of such an environmental policy is to worsen the tendency for firms 
to agglomerate: compared to the case without environmental policies, concentration occurs now 
for a higher transportation cost (r*’(θ )>0). 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The empirical evidence indicates that agglomeration of activities occurs, even if it generates 
excessive pollution. Focusing on the consequences of an environmental policy in a model of 
economic geography, we show the basis of a moral hazard problem: by reducing the effect of 
centrifugal force and enlarging the range of transportation costs for which the market size effect 
dominates, environmental policies increasing the firms’ marginal cost may stimulate agglomeration, 
then global pollution.  
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